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Social Preferences and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 67, S. 267-280
Competence versus Honesty: What Do Voters Care About?
We set up an experiment to measure voter preferences trade-offs between competence and honesty. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the fi rst stage's competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs.
BASE
Competence versus Honesty: What Do Voters Care About?
We set up an experiment to measure voter preferences trade-offs between competence and honesty. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the fi rst stage's competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs.
BASE
Competence Versus Honesty: What Do Voters Care About?
SSRN
Working paper
Competence versus Honesty: What Do Voters Care About?
We set up an experiment to measure voter preferences trade-offs between competence and honesty. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the fi rst stage's competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs.
BASE
Competence versus Honesty: What Do Voters Care About?
We set up an experiment to measure voter preferences trade-offs between competence and honesty. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the fi rst stage's competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs.
BASE
Competence Versus Honesty: What Do Voters Care About?
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
Envy and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia
In: Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) Discussion Paper 11-12
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
Learning to play 3x3 games: neural networks as bounded-rational players
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 27-38
"We present a neural network methodology for learning game-playing rules in general. Existing research suggests learning to find a Nash equilibrium in a new game is too difficult a task for a neural network, but says little about what it will do instead. We observe that a neural network trained to find Nash equilibria in a known subset of games will use self-taught rules developed endogenously when facing new games. These rules are close to payoff dominance and its best response. Our findings are consistent with existing experimental results, both in terms of subject's methodology and success rates." [author's abstract]
Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample
In: China economic review, Band 83, S. 102080
ISSN: 1043-951X
Nudging the Food Basket Green: The Effects of Commitment and Badges on the Carbon Footprint of Food Shopping
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 87, Heft 1, S. 89-133
ISSN: 1573-1502
AbstractWe use an incentive-compatible experimental online supermarket to test the role of commitment and badges in reducing the carbon footprint of grocery shopping. In the experiment, some participants had the opportunity to voluntarily commit to a low carbon footprint basket before their online grocery shopping; the commitment was forced upon other participants. We also study the impact of an online badge as a soft reward for the achievement of a low carbon footprint basket. Participants from the general population shopped over two weeks, with the experimental stimuli only in week 2; and received their shopping baskets and any unspent budget. Results indicate that requesting a commitment prior to entering the store leads to a reduction in carbon footprint of 9–12%. When the commitment is voluntary, reductions are driven by consumers who accept the commitment. Commitments also reduced the consumption of fats and, for forced commitments, that of salt by 18%. Badges did not significantly impact consumer behaviour. Commitment mechanisms, either forced or voluntary, appear effective in motivating an environmental goal and search for low-carbon options, particularly in those accepting the commitment.
Conflict and reciprocity: A study with Palestinian youths
In: Journal of development economics, Band 160, S. 102989
ISSN: 0304-3878